



#### **STATEMENT**

### General

File number: HCLJ510-2017-336

UTC date: 20-7-2017 UTC time: 15:10

Occurrence class: Serious incident

Location: 330 nautical miles (nm) north of Kangerlussuaq (BGSF)

Injury level: None

Information source: Air Safety Report, Occurrence report, Interview, Operator's aircraft

technical documentation

#### Aircraft

Aircraft registration: D-ABUK

Make/model: BOEING 767 300

Current flight rules: Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)

Operation type: Commercial Air Transport Passenger Airline

Flight phase: En route

Aircraft category: Fixed Wing Aeroplane Large Aeroplane

Last departure point: Germany EDDF (FRA): FRANKFURT / MAIN

Planned destination: United States of America KLAS (LAS): Las Vegas, Nv/Mc Carran Intl

Aircraft damage: None

## **Notification**

All times in this report are UTC.

The Aviation Unit of the Danish Accident Investigation Board (AIB) was notified of the serious incident by an air traffic controller at Sondrestrom Tower on 20-7-2017 at 16:58 hours.

The AIB notified the Danish Transport, Construction and Housing Authority (DTCHA), the American National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the German Bundesstelle für Flugunfalluntersuchung (BFU), the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport (DG MOVE) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) of the serious incident on 24-7-2017 at 11:41 hours.

Upon ending the preliminary safety investigation, the AIB decided - in accordance with article 5 of EC Regulation No. 996/2010 and § 138 of the Danish Air Navigation Act - not to conduct any further safety investigations. With reference to article 16 of EC Regulation No. 996/2010 and § 143 of the Danish Air Navigation Act, this statement closes the AIB safety investigation.

# History of the flight

The serious incident occurred during a scheduled commercial flight from Frankfurt (EDDF) to Las Vegas (KLAS).

While en-route and overhead Greenland cruising at Flight Level 330, the first officer noticed a strange smell – "*like burning rubber*" – coming from the right hand side of the cockpit.

The smell slowly intensified and seemed to be coming from the air outlet to the right of the first officer's instrument panel.

A cabin crew member was summoned to the cockpit. He noticed a smell in the cockpit that he stated was not present in the cabin.

The flight crew initiated a troubleshooting conferring with the operator's technical department via satellite telephone.

Because the smell intensified, the flight crew decided to perform the "Smoke, Fire or Fumes" checklist.

Approximately 30 minutes after the smell appeared, the flight crew declared a state of urgency (PAN PAN) to Reykjavik Control and requested diversion to Kangerlussuaq (BGSF), which was located approximately 330 nautical miles to the south of aircraft position.

During the descent, the "Smoke, Fire or Fumes" checklist was completed and the flight crew had donned their oxygen masks.

The aircraft safely landed at BGSF at 16:11 hours without any further technical issues.

During the event, neither fire nor smoke was observed and no person suffered any injury.

After the aircraft had parked, the airport fire and rescue service personnel entered the aircraft and inspected the cabin and the cockpit. Then the commander and the fire and rescue service personnel inspected the aircraft electronic equipment compartment. Both inspections revealed neither signs of fire nor smoke and the smell was only identifiable in the cockpit.

The operator dispatched a replacement aircraft with maintenance personnel to BGSF.

The maintenance personnel did not find any technical issues with the aircraft except for some food residues left in an oven in the forward galley, which they concluded was the source of the smell.

Upon ending the preliminary safety investigation, the AIB decided - in accordance with article 5 of EC Regulation No. 996/2010 and § 138 of the Danish Air Navigation Act - not to conduct any further safety investigations. With reference to article 16 of EC Regulation No. 996/2010 and § 143 of the Danish Air Navigation Act, this statement closes the AIB safety investigation.

The aircraft was subsequently released to service.
The serious incident occurred during daylight and in visual meteorological conditions (at BGSF).
Upon ending the preliminary safety investigation, the AIB decided - in accordance with article 5 of EC Regulation No. 996/2010 and § 138 of the Danish Air Navigation Act - not to conduct any further safety investigations. With reference to article 16 of EC Regulation No. 996/2010 and § 143 of the Danish Air Navigation Act, this statement closes the AIB safety investigation.